How Taiwan is preparing for a war with China

The invasion begins with a missile barrage. As an armada of thousands of vessels and a million troops amasses along China’s southern coast, rockets slam into Taiwan and the surrounding waters, destroying command centers, airfields, military bases, naval vessels, and key infrastructure in an attempt to cripple the Taiwanese military’s ability to respond. But not all hope is lost for the defendant.

In the weeks leading up to the assault, intelligence reports had shown that China was preparing for an invasion, giving Taiwan time to reposition forces and construct blockades to impede the Chinese attack. As Chinese forces make their way across the Taiwan Strait, anti-ship missiles scream across the sky as they target enemy vessels. Small assault boats prepare to attack the invading armada, and along the beaches at which China could land ground forces, surviving troops stand ready.

Meanwhile in Washington, government officials and senior military leaders hold emergency closed door meetings to decide on a response. As Chinese forces draw near, Taiwan holds its breath - will America come to its defense?

What: Taiwan holds annual island defense exercise

Last week, Taiwan conducted its annual Han Kuang military exercise, a five-day drill intended to prepare its forces for a Chinese invasion.

The exercise began on Monday with a notional missile attack on command centers and key military targets, reportedly to test the “preservation capabilities” of Taiwan’s military and the readiness of its reserve forces. In an actual attack, China would likely strike such targets in order to paralyze Taiwan’s ability to respond. Therefore, withstanding such an initial attack is vital to Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.

Some of Taiwan’s 22 new combined arms battalions took part in the exercises. The battalions are intended to operate independently through its fusion of infantry, cavalry, branch liaison officers, snipers, and unmanned systems and missile operators. Taiwan also conducted a public air raid drill simulating a Chinese missile attack.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said the exercise was intended to test the island’s defense strategies, “which involve maintaining combat capabilities, pursuing decisive victory in coastal zones and subduing enemies in beach areas.”

The possibility of these drills becoming a reality are not guaranteed, but they can’t be brushed off either. The Chinese government views Taiwan as part of China, but a growing number of Taiwanese are in favor of formal independence. For years, China has expressed that it will not allow Taiwan to become a sovereign state. With China’s military rise and Washington’s increased support for Taiwan, concerns are growing that China may use force to reel Taiwan in.

When: A brief history of US-China-Taiwan relations

Like most modern issues, understanding the nuanced relations between the US, China, and Taiwan requires examining their pasts.

The year 1949 is a good starting point. At that time, the US-friendly president of the Republic of China (ROC), Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan with his ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party after being defeated by communist forces in a civil war. The communist leader, Mao Zedong, subsequently established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which would be governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since then, neither side has acknowledged the legitimacy of the other.

The communist party in China views Taiwan as part of China and aims to unify Taiwan with the mainland. For a while it hoped that Taiwan would cede to its wishes. In the years after Chiang fled with his supporters, China and Taiwan considered a political framework much like the One Country, Two Systems framework implemented - and now called into question - in Hong Kong. In essence, it would have formally established Taiwan as a “special administrative region” of mainland China while allowing it to retain its distinct capitalist economic system and a limited degree of autonomy. In the 1980s, the ruling KMT favored unification and maintained an authoritative rule over Taiwan. Given the circumstances, Beijing believed peaceful unification was possible.

For thirty years, the US retained relations with the ROC in Taiwan. The two countries even agreed to a defense treaty in 1954. But in 1979, the US dropped its formal relations with Taiwan and instead established ties with the government in mainland China under a “one China” policy. This controversial policy is an acknowledgement by the US that there is only one Chinese government. In effect, it showed that the US recognized the PRC as the sole and legitimate China while also acknowledging the “governing authorities on Taiwan”. However, the US didn’t want to cut all ties with Taiwan, so Congress passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which allowed Washington to retain unofficial relations with Taiwan while also committing it to meeting Taiwan’s security needs. The TRA has guided US relations with Taiwan ever since, but its security obligation has also caused tensions with China.

In the early 1990s, Taiwan became a democracy. Combined with the emergence of a distinct sense of Taiwanese identity and the rise of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose ultimate aim was an independent Taiwan, China’s hope for a peaceful unification achieved through negotiations began to fade.

A glimmer of hope returned in the mid-to-late 2000s with a push by the KMT to improve relations with China and the election of the KMT leader Ma Ying-Jeou as president. Ma assured China that he would not seek independence and instead sought better relations with Beijing with the aim of ensuring that China would never use military force against Taiwan. In turn, China allowed Taiwan a limited degree of participation in the international community. Yet divisions in the KMT over Ma’s policies and pushback from the public hampered negotiations. In 2016, the DPP came to power. The election of Tsai Ing-wen, a staunch advocate for Taiwan’s sovereignty, as president precipitated a downturn in relations.

While Taiwan and China’s economies have become more interdependent over the years, a distinct Taiwanese identity and the desire for an independent state have grown stronger. Coupled with the rise of the DPP, the election of Tsai Ing-wen, and strengthening ties between Taiwan and the US, China’s concerns about Taiwan declaring formal independence have grown. While China still favors a peaceful path to unification, it has increasingly stated its willingness to use military force to prevent Taiwan from seeking to officially become a sovereign state.

Why and how Taiwan is preparing for war with China

As we’ve seen, China is highly sensitive about Taiwan, which is why so many analysts and experts see it as one of the most likely flash points for a US-China conflict.

Under the Trump administration, Washington has strengthened its support for Taiwan at the same time that its relations with China have deteriorated. Prior to last week’s Han Kuang military exercise, the US State Department approved a $620 million missile defense upgrade to Taiwan. It was said to be the seventh arms sale to Taiwan during the Trump presidency. Previous deals included the sale of F-16 fighter jets and M1 Abrams Tanks. Beijing has repeatedly called for the US to stop providing military equipment to Taiwan.

As China becomes more powerful, concerns grow about its intentions abroad. With the modernization and expansion of its military, especially its navy and air force, many are especially worried about China using military force to unify Taiwan.

Taiwan recognizes this threat, and it hasn’t been passive about preparing for a Chinese invasion. But questions and uncertainty abound about the state of Taiwan’s military and the inconsistencies between its defense strategy and the weapons and systems it is buying and producing.

China’s military is more powerful than Taiwan’s in almost every way. Its defense budget is exponentially larger and it has far more - and in many cases, better - troops, tanks, aircraft, and vessels than Taiwan. Yet it is China’s missile arsenal that is most formidable to Taiwan. Over the past few decades, China has developed advanced ballistic and cruise missiles with high precision. There are believed to be at least 1,500 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, not including hundreds of cruise missiles based on land and at sea. What makes these weapons an even greater challenge is their ability to target American forces that might come to Taiwan's aid in a conflict.

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act obligates the US to provide for Taiwan’s security. Some argue that this also requires the US to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. While the US has stayed true to providing weapons and armaments to Taiwan, there remains uncertainty about whether Washington would deem the protection of Taiwan worth the high costs of a war with China.

However, there would be more than the fate of Taiwan at stake that might prompt the US to respond. Taking Taiwan would be strategically advantageous for China because it would allow it access to the Pacific Ocean and the ability to more easily target US forces. Taiwan is also located near some of the most heavily trafficked maritime trading lanes in the world. Lastly, failing to support Taiwan could diminish trust among Washington’s other East Asia allies, specifically South Korea and Japan, in America’s resolve to defend them.

Recognizing the threat posed by the Chinese missile regime and its inability to compete toe-to-toe with China, Taiwan’s former Chief of the General Staff, Adm. Lee Hsi-ming, put forward a new defense strategy in 2017 that favored asymmetrical warfare capabilities. Asymmetric tactics involve unconventional weapons and are often adopted by a weaker force when confronting a more powerful enemy.

Titled the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), the plan promotes mass numbers of smaller, maneuverable, less detectable systems over larger, more conventional weapon systems - such as fast attack boats and sea mines instead of a naval destroyer or cruiser. In conjunction with these smaller, lighter systems, the ODC also aims to capitalize on Taiwan’s geography and strike the enemy when it is most weak.

The concept involves two stages. The first revolves around dealing a heavy blow to Chinese forces attempting to cross the Taiwan Strait through a mix of offensive and defensive weapons, including anti-ship missiles fired from trucks on land and ships near Taiwan’s shores. The second phase aims to slow and batter Chinese forces as they attempt beach landings through the use of mines, small attack vessels, and anti-ship cruise missiles fired from more trucks. Chinese forces that manage to make it through these defenses would then face heavy fire from artillery and attack helicopters. Taiwan would also use its US-made Patriot and indigenous Tian Kung-2 air defense systems to prevent China from gaining air superiority.

In order to survive the mass missile attack that military experts believe would come at the start of a conflict, the ODC also calls for strengthening force preservation through improvements in areas like mobility, camouflage, and concealment. Such a missile attack would likely render many fixed-wing aircraft, like the F-16, obsolete and also destroy large surface ships armed with Hsiung Feng-2 and -3 anti-ship missiles. Because of this, Taiwan is investing in smaller attack vessels and the quality and quantity of missiles and their delivery systems. Along with below ground command centers, underground air bases located along Taiwan’s east coast could play a vital role in a conflict, as the Chiashan air base did during last week’s exercise when aircraft and supplies were repositioned there and put on standby. At the start of a conflict, forces would be dispersed across Taiwan and decoy targets would be erected as well to minimize losses.

Another problem that China’s large missile arsenal poses is its potential to overwhelm Taiwan’s defense capacity. The amount of Chinese missiles could exceed the number of anti-missile interceptors that Taiwan possesses. Missile defense doctrine calls for two interceptors for every one missile to increase the likelihood of intercepting the missile. Second, Taiwan’s command and control systems could be overwhelmed in the event of a mass missile barrage. For example, the speed of China’s DF-16 ballistic missile may be able to outpace Taiwan’s US-provided Patriot defense systems. While missile defense systems have evolved over the years, the odds are still on the side of the attacker with a large enough missile inventory.

Still, China faces its own issue with maximizing this capability - deploying enough transporter erector launchers (TEL) to carry out a massive missile attack. When one also takes into account other factors that would be at play during such an attack, such as electronic and information warfare, questions emerge of just how such an offensive would play out.

The ODC’s end goal is to deny China the ability to land and reinforce troops on the island and buy time for international support to arrive, specifically from the US. The latter part of the concept has long been part of Taiwan defense plans as the country recognizes it is incapable of facing China on its own.

Despite the clear guidance and needs outlined by the ODC, President Tsai has come under fire by critics who say she has invested more in conventional systems rather than asymmetrical capabilities. While Taiwan is developing asymmetric weapons like sea mines, these critics point to recent Taiwan procurements like its purchase of 66 F-16 fighter jets and 100 M1 Abrams Tanks late last year as proof of a leaning toward more conventional armaments procurement. Critics also note Taiwan’s indigenous submarine development program and plans to construct a 22,000 landing helicopter dock vessel, apparently with the capability to carry F-35B fighter jets that Taiwan may be planning to buy.

Even prior to recent purchases, Taiwan already possessed an array of US-provided conventional weapons, such as Patriot Advanced Capability missile defense systems, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, and earlier versions of the F-16. While a number of these are modern, Taiwan also possesses outdated equipment, such as submarines from World War II. This is in part due to the reluctance of previous US administrations to sell more advanced equipment to Taiwan out of fear of angering China.

In addition to disagreements over whether Taiwan is purchasing and producing the right kind of weapons and armament are concerns about the condition of Taiwan’s military. Earlier this year, Foreign Policy reported that out of the 215,000 positions budgeted on paper by Taiwan’s defense ministry, only 153,000 were filled. Cited news reports further suggested that most ground combat units only had between 60 to 80 percent manpower.

Part of this manpower shortage has to do with a failed attempt to transition from a conscription-based military to an all-volunteer force. Prior to 2017, all conscripts served for one year. Now, the obligated time is a maximum of four months, of which five-weeks alone is basic training. As such, a Taiwanese lieutenant colonel told Foreign Policy that the conscripts do not participate in training or exercises. “It’s basically a summer camp,” he reportedly said.

The transition to an all volunteer force introduced a minimum of four year enlistments in a bid to solve the issues caused by conscription. However, many of the enlisted volunteer troops have opted for non-ground combat related jobs, which has contributed to the shortage in front line units. Pay, living conditions, and benefits are also said to be poor. While the man power shortage is not only an issue for those forced to pick up the slack in combat arms units, it also skews the war games and computer simulations that Taiwan conducts, both of which assume 90 percent fighting strength.

There is also skepticism surrounding the reliability of Taiwan’s supposed 2 million man reserve force. A retired Taiwanese army lieutenant colonel said that in the event of a war, these forces, regardless of their military occupation, would be massed together into poorly equipped infantry brigades led by officers unprepared to lead such units. There are reportedly no plans in place to fill active units with qualified reserve personnel. Furthermore, it is questionable if Taiwan even possesses enough weapons to equip their purported 2 million reservists, or whether they have sufficient plans for how to implement them. Late last year, the Budget Center of Taiwan’s legislature reported that 60 percent of the country’s reserve forces had not undergone formal training in eight years. A “reserve warrior program” launched by the Taiwanese military seems to be an attempt to correct the reserve issue by having reservists train a few days a month with their original unit, but the number of troops who have participated in the program have been relatively few.

Nonetheless, and in spite of these concerns, Taiwan’s fate is not as fatalistic as it might seem. Experts who have studied Chinese military documents say that its military leaders view an invasion of Taiwan as a hefty gamble.

Much of the success of an invasion of Taiwan is contingent upon surprise, something that would be nearly impossible to achieve. For one, the amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be the largest in history, requiring thousands of mostly commandeered vessels to transport one million Chinese troops across the Taiwan Strait. The amassing of such a large number of troops and ships would not go unnoticed by US and Taiwanese intelligence. Second, the assault would only be possible in April or October due to poor weather and sea conditions during the rest of the year. Lastly, there is a limited number of beaches at which China could land troops, all of which would be heavily fortified.These factors make it difficult for China to achieve the surprise element it would need. Chinese military planners believe they would need to secure Taiwan in under two weeks in order to establish sufficient defense positions to respond to US and international counterattacks. Failure to do so, they say, would lead to defeat.

(The Taiwan Strait is 143 miles long at its widest point and only 81 at its narrowest. Source: Google Maps)

With growing support in Taiwan for independence, increased US support for Taiwan, worsening relations between Washington and Beijing, the reelection of President Tsai earlier this year, and China’s rising military might, the future surrounding Taiwan is uncertain. Beijing may choose to continue with attempts to persuade Taiwan to agree to unification. It may choose the military option. Or it could take a middle-of-the-road approach that exploits Taiwan’s inherent weaknesses and intimidates the public and government in order to break down opposition to unification. Regardless of which strategy it decides on, Taiwan promises to remain a contentious issue for the foreseeable future.